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STANDING IN THE WAKE OF STATUTES
Mark Seidenfeld* & Allie Akre**

In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court held that when Congress
creates a legal interest to see that the law is followed, the deprivation of that
interest, without more, is insufficient to allow a plaintiff to meet Article III’s
standing requirements. Lujan created significant uncertainty about Congress’s
ability to influence judicial standing inquiries by creating statutory rights,
especially in light of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and the majority’s footnote
seven. This Article argues that Kennedy’s concurrence and footnote seven are best
explained by recognizing that Congress is institutionally superior to courts in
evaluating the gravity of likely harms and the causal chains between statutory
violations and those harms—evaluations that may bear on whether a plaintiff has
met the injury in fact and traceability elements of Article III standing. The Article
takes this explanation further, contending that the structure of statutory provisions
that do not create causes of action nonetheless reveal legislators’ likely
understanding of the significance of certain harms, and the causal connections
between those harms and statutory violations. Thus, legislators’ understandings
should influence judges’ standing inquiries. Finally, the Article suggests that
courts should rely on the purpose of statutory provisions to determine legislators’
understanding, which could guide a judge in evaluating injury in fact and
traceability, given that the alternative is the subjective evaluation of the judge
without meaningful constraint by relevant legal standards.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses the role the legislature should play within the
current doctrine of constitutional standing when a plaintiff sues to vindicate a right
conferred by statute.1 Constitutional standing is a plaintiff’s ticket to the
courthouse in every federal case.2 There are three “irreducible constitutional
minimum” elements of standing: (1) injury in fact, which must be “concrete and
particularized” and “actual or imminent”; (2) traceability, which is “a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of” that is “fairly . . .
trace[able] to the challenged action”; and (3) redressability, which means that “it
must be ‘likely’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be
‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”3 In cases where the injury is alleged to be
caused by ongoing conduct, the second and third elements collapse because a court
can remedy the injury by enjoining the ongoing conduct. Thus, in most situations,
redressability and traceability are two sides of the same coin: the causal nexus
between the alleged wrongful conduct and plaintiff’s injury.
The scope of congressional power to influence standing has been a source
of significant controversy.4 Prior to the judicial creation of the current doctrine, a
plaintiff had standing if he could demonstrate a deprivation of a legal interest—
that is, an interest recognized at common law or otherwise granted by statute. 5 By
creating statutory causes of action, Congress essentially provided standing for

1.
This Article addresses standing in any action premised on statutory conferral
of a benefit. It may address standing questions that arise in a constitutional claim when the
claim asserts that a statutory benefit has been denied in contravention of the Constitution.
See, e.g., infra, notes 139–43 and accompanying text (discussing Linda R.S., which
involved an equal protection clause challenge to Texas courts’ interpretation that the State’s
child support statute did not to apply to illegitimate children).
2.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
3.
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal citation
omitted).
4.
Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1023, 1050–52 (2009) (describing the debate between Liberals and
Conservatives about Congress’s role in standing inquiries).
5.
See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
“Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, (1992) (describing the evolution of the
Supreme Court’s standing doctrine from the “legal interest” to the “injury in fact” test).
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persons to invoke the power of federal courts to the extent that Congress deemed
warranted. In 1970, in an attempt to level the playing field for beneficiaries of
regulatory statutes, the Supreme Court expanded the interests that give rise to
standing to include injuries in fact caused by an alleged violation.6 Although the
Court initially did not indicate that the injury-in-fact doctrine might limit the legal
interest test, shortly after announcing that doctrine, the Court used it to deny
standing to those who seemed to have legal interests that were statutorily
protected.7 Ever since, the injury-in-fact doctrine has spawned a host of scholarly
criticism of the injury in fact formulation of standing.
Much of this critical scholarship on standing law advocates changes to
fundamental aspects of standing law doctrine. 8 Some scholars call for abandoning
the traditional standing analysis,9 while some suggest a simplified approach to
standing,10 and still others suggest adding to the doctrine’s three essential
elements.11 But it seems highly unlikely that the Court will abandon or
fundamentally modify its standing doctrine anytime soon.
This Article pursues a line of scholarship that tries to make sense of the
judicial opinions that apply the injury-in-fact formulation of standing. In particular,
it focuses on the extent to which current law leaves Congress a significant role in
influencing judicial determinations of standing elements.12 Like other scholarship
in this line, this Article addresses the extent to which statutory influence fits within
the framework presented in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.13

6.
Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151–52 (1970);
see also Sunstein, supra note 5, at 183–85.
7.
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 736 (1972).
8.
See Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91
B.U. L. REV. 159, 177 (2011).
9.
See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221,
223 (1988).
10.
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 5, at 166–67.
11.
See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Fortuity and the Article III “Case”: A
Critique of Fletcher’s the Structure of Standing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 289, 328 (2013)
(suggesting incorporating into the current injury-in-fact inquiry “whether the harm befell the
plaintiff by happenstance.”).
12.
The authors do not express any opinion in this Article about whether it would
be better to abandon current standing doctrine, which has been greatly criticized for
allowing the courts to convert passive virtues into passive aggression. See, e.g., Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1742–43 (1999) (finding
support for the proposition that “judges provide [standing] to individuals who seek to
further the political and ideological agendas of judges”); Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling
Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 669 (2004) (concluding after empirical study that federal
courts of appeal decide standing cases based on ideology when there are insufficient
precedents and judicial oversight to make a threat of reversal substantial); Emerson H. Tiller
& Frank B. Cross, What is Legal Doctrine, 100 NW. L. REV. 517, 520 (2006) (“The most
likely explanation for standing rules is a doctrinal attempt to influence the ideology of
future lower court decisions.”). Rather, this Article limits its inquiry into Congress’s
legitimate role within the core of current standing doctrine.
13.
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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Although others have analyzed this important question, we believe that
the existing scholarship has not paid close enough attention to the contours of the
various Lujan opinions and subsequent Supreme Court opinions analyzing the
relationship of statutory rights and structure to the standing inquiry. Specifically,
this Article argues that Congress can influence standing analysis in several ways:
(1) explicitly, through carefully crafted statutes that create causes of action to
protect an identified interest; (2) implicitly, by creating procedural rights from
which courts can infer congressional recognition of the causal connection between
a plaintiff’s concrete interest and the denial of that procedure; (3) through the
Court’s determination of Congress’s recognition of actual harms or causal
connections from statutory structure or other circumstantial evidence; and (4) by
judicial construction of statutory purpose as an indication of how the enacting
Congress likely would have evaluated injuries and causal connections.
Central to our argument is the notion that Congress cannot create
standing, but that it can recognize interests and thereby influence judicial
evaluation of whether an interest is sufficiently concrete and immediate to justify
standing. Standing is predicated on actual injury to the plaintiff. As the Court in
Lujan noted, “[statutory] broadening of the categories of injury that may be alleged
in support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the requirement that
the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury.”14 Therefore, this
Article contends that although Congress cannot ignore Article III standing
limitations, it has the power to elevate the status of legally cognizable concrete
injuries “that were previously inadequate in law.”15
Part I of this Article lays out a normative argument in favor of allowing
Congress to recognize actual harms as injury-in-fact, and connections between
statutory and regulatory violations and such injury as adequately traceable. Part II
describes the majority holding in Lujan, which views standing law as limiting
Congress’s prerogatives to authorize plaintiffs to use federal courts to remedy
injuries that courts would otherwise find insufficient to satisfy standing criteria.
Part III discusses Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan, and explains how it
supports the thesis of this Article that Congress can influence standing by
explicitly recognizing actual harms and causal connections. Part IV examines
Justice Scalia’s footnote seven in Lujan, and explores the implications of
procedural rights as a means for Congress implicitly to influence standing. Part V
discusses how the structure of statutory provisions and other circumstantial
evidence can imply Congress’s recognition of harms and causal connections on
standing. Part VI suggests that it is often appropriate for judges to go beyond
statutory text and structure—that is, to consider statutory purpose as derived from
context—as part of their inquiries into standing. Judges can then discern

14.
Id. at 578 (internal citation omitted); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
501 (1975) (stating that although “Congress may grant an express right of action to persons
who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules . . . [Article] III’s requirement
remains: the plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself.”).
15.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578.
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legislators’ understanding of the significance of potential injuries and the
likelihood of causal connections in evaluating standing in particular cases.

I. NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS FOR CONGRESS’S ROLE IN STANDING
A. Congress’s Institutional Superiority
Standing often depends on attributes of the injury alleged that are better
evaluated by Congress than by the judiciary. The Court has made clear that a
plaintiff cannot utilize the federal courts to redress an ideological objection to
prohibited conduct: The desire to see the law followed is never an injury in fact.16
For injuries that are too abstract or trivial, however, one might question whether a
desire to see the law followed, rather than the injury remedied, truly drove the
plaintiff to sue. This uncertainty might help explain the doctrinal requirement that
injuries-in-fact be sufficiently concrete and palpable in order to support standing.
Some injuries, such as physical injuries and loss of property, are
sufficiently palpable, so there is no doubt about whether the plaintiff has suffered
them. In some cases, however, the Court has allowed plaintiffs who allege injuries
that are not easily verified to sue in federal courts. For example, the Court has
allowed plaintiffs to sue for affronts to their aesthetic sensibilities.17 It has
suggested that even emotional injuries, such as fear or stigma, may suffice as
injury in fact.18 For cases involving these less tangible injuries, the Court has to
answer two questions: First, is the nature of the injury grave enough to warrant
allowing the harmed person to invoke the courts to redress the injury? Second,
because the injury cannot be directly verified, is it reasonable to believe that a
person in the plaintiff’s position would actually suffer such injury in response to
the alleged wrongful act?
In many cases, Congress will be better at answering these questions than
the courts because there is no objective scale by which to measure whether a
particular kind of injury is sufficiently concrete and significant to warrant invoking

16.
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998)
(“[A]lthough a suitor may derive great comfort and joy from the fact that the United States
Treasury is not cheated, that a wrongdoer gets his just deserts, or that the Nation's laws are
faithfully enforced, that psychic satisfaction is not an acceptable Article III remedy because
it does not redress a cognizable Article III injury.”); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 (rejecting
violation of “an abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental ‘right’ to have the Executive
observe the procedures required by law” as injury in fact); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
754 (1984). See also Sunstein, supra note 5, at 188–89 (characterizing the Court as
“classifying some harms as injuries in fact and other harms as purely ideological”).
17.
See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686–88 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
734 (1972) (dicta stating that aesthetic harm can be injury in fact).
18.
See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 184–85 (2000) (finding fear to be injury in fact); Allen, 468 U.S. at 755 (dicta
stating that stigma “is one of the most serious consequences of discriminatory government
action and is sufficient in some circumstances to support standing”).
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a judicial remedy.19 That sufficiency depends on an assessment of the impact that a
person who is injured by the violation is likely to perceive. The assessment
essentially involves an informed value judgment.20 Congress is institutionally
better situated than courts to make such a determination because its members are
both closer to the people and more accountable to the polity generally than are
judges, who regard these questions through the lens of a closed record created by a
formal judicial process.21
Moreover, courts are, by their very nature, bound to legal judgment,
which suggests that they tread on suspect ground when they override value
judgments made by the political branches of government. 22 When questions cannot
be resolved by objective means, it is ultimately up to the elected representatives of
the people to resolve them. 23 In these instances, “federal judges—who have no
constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices of those who do.”24
As Justice Scalia noted, albeit in a somewhat different context, “there is no right
answer to how many injuries are worth how much cost. It is essentially something
you vote on and not analyze.”25 From this, one can surmise that even Scalia, the
strongest proponent of limiting congressional influence over standing, cannot

19.
See Fletcher, supra note 9, at 231–33 (arguing that, conceptually, injury in
fact is incapable of distinguishing between plaintiffs who honestly allege some injury);
Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 WISC. L. REV. 897,
926–29 (defining injury as a “setback to a person’s interest” but then noting that “the task of
determining what interests matter is a subjective one—perhaps hopelessly so”); Sunstein,
supra note 5, at 188–89 (determining what counts as injury in fact is a value-laden
judgment). See also Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1194 (2014)
(“[A]dequate factual injury is the touchstone of the Court’s standing analysis—except when
it isn’t.”). In short, there is no acceptable metric for what a judge will find sufficiently
concrete. Cf. Lin, supra, at 938 (concluding that the concept of harm for standing is not
entirely subjective but depends on community norms).
20.
See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation,
42 DUKE L.J. 1141, 1155 (1993) (“[T]he injury determination necessarily entails an
exploration of what we wish to recognize as harm.”).
21.
Cf. William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in RightsEnforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 938 (2013) (suggesting
that the Court should defer to Congress’s determinations in equal protection cases because
the Court’s “doctrine requires judgments that Congress is better suited to make”); Note, A
Chevron for the House and Senate: Deferring to Post-Enactment Congressional Resolutions
That Interpret Ambiguous Statutes, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1507, 1510 (2011) (The superior
political accountability of the houses of Congress gives “each . . . a comparative
institutional advantage over courts in making democratic value judgments”).
22.
Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious
Review, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 159 (2012).
23.
Id. at 193.
24.
John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 626 (1996).
25.
Antonin Scalia, The Role of the Judiciary in Deregulation, 55 ANTITRUST
L.J. 191, 196 (1986).
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easily disavow Congress’s superior capacity to evaluate the gravity of alleged
injuries.26
In addition, standing depends on traceability and redressability, which in
the usual case depends on the likelihood that the alleged wrongful conduct caused
the injury. When that likelihood is evaluated based on the probability of harm to
individuals who fall within a broad class potentially affected by the wrongful
conduct, the inquiry is no longer one about the particular party to the proceeding. It
becomes an inquiry of “legislative fact” (i.e., facts of a general nature about how
people perceive and are likely to react to specific events or stimuli). 27 As the label
suggests, Congress enjoys an institutional advantage over courts in that inquiry.28
The expansive fact-finding mechanisms of the legislature render Congress
better equipped to identify these causal connections, which depend on such factors
as technical effects of violations of the law and likely third-party reactions to those
violations. Congress enjoys superior information gathering capabilities. 29 It has the
authority to demand information from those with expertise about general causal
relations and is not limited to the facts that particular parties were able to marshal
and introduce into the record. Congress, unlike the judiciary, is not “shackled by
the temporal and reactive nature of litigation.”30 The legislature is not limited by
time constraints, prohibitions on information-gathering techniques (such as ex

26.
See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983) (noting that the gravity of a
harm that a person shares with a large segment of the populous “is a fair subject for
democratic debate in which he may persuade the rest of us”). Justice Scalia’s objection to
Congress influencing standing is grounded in his view that the role of courts is “protecting
individuals and minorities against impositions of the majority.” Id. Despite Scalia’s attempts
to demonstrate that the Court’s role has historically been so understood, his assertion that
Article III precludes Congress from authorizing courts to protect against harms shared
widely by the public where Congress has created a cause of action is questionable at best.
See LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 459–500 (1965).
27.
See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942) (“[T]he facts which inform [an
agency’s] legislative judgment may conveniently be denominated legislative facts”).
28.
See Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative
Lawmaking: A Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 7
(1986) (“Unlike legislators and unlike administrative rulemakers, courts are often
inadequately informed about democratic desires . . . . [C]ourts often have inadequate
legislative facts, that is, the facts that bear on the court’s choices about law and policy.”);
Phillip B. Kurland, Toward a Political Supreme Court, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 19, 38 (1969)
(“[T]he Court . . . lacks machinery for gathering the wide range of facts and opinions that
should inform the judgment of a prime policymaker.”); but cf. Neal Devins, Congressional
Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169,
1179–81 (2000) (noting that Congress has superior capabilities for legislative fact finding,
but may lack sufficient motivation to find such facts accurately).
29.
Kate T. Spelman, Revising Judicial Review of Legislative Findings of
Scientific and Medical “Fact”: A Modified Due Process Approach, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 837, 857–59 (2009).
30.
Devins, supra note 28, at 1180.
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parte communications), stare decisis, or the ways parties frame a case.31 Indeed,
Congress’s fact-finding resources are vast compared to the Court’s; they include
more funds, staff, and procedures devoted to information gathering. 32 Moreover,
“[t]he greater number of members and their varied backgrounds and experience
make it virtually certain that the typical legislature will command wider
knowledge and keener appreciation of current social and economic conditions than
will the typical court.”33 As Professor Bill Buzbee points out, “[f]rom a
comparative institutional analysis perspective, courts are simply unsuited to
evaluate independently either general legislative judgments about statutory goals
and process or the significance of particular legal breaches and associated
litigation.”34 In sum, evaluating the gravity of injury and its connection to statutory
violation involves both findings of legislative fact, at which Congress is more
adept than courts, and determining the desirability of value-laden trade-offs, which
must rely on the democratic accountability of Congress.
B. Defense of Imputing Congressional Understanding
It is one thing to assert Congress’s superiority in evaluating injuries and
causal chains that give rise to standing; it is another to assert that imputation of
such understanding based on statutes Congress enacts should influence judicial
standing inquiries. In virtually no statute does Congress explicitly evaluate the
gravity of injuries that might be caused by statutory violations or the causal
connections between such violations and those injuries. As will become clear from
our discussion that follows, we infer legislators’ likely understanding of the
significance of injuries and causal connections from the statutory provisions they
enact. Thus, our arguments for having courts credit statutory influence on standing
essentially mimic those that purposivist interpreters use to attribute meaning to
statutory provisions.
For the purposivist,35 “[t]he Court’s job is . . . to determine the
background policy at which Congress was driving, and then to read the statute to
carry out that purpose.”36 Purposivists look beyond statutory text to the context in
which the legislation was enacted, including legislative history in its broadest

31.
Id. at 1179–80.
32.
Id. at 1178–79.
33.
Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40
U. CIN. L. REV. 199, 209 (1971).
34.
William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y F. 247, 279–80 (2001).
35.
Purposivism is usually contrasted with Textualism, which seeks to find the
best public meaning of the words of a statute at the time it was enacted. For a discussion of
the distinctions between Textualism and Purposivism, as they are currently invoked, see
generally John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM L.
REV. 70 (2006)
36.
John F. Manning, Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2014).
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sense.37 They may also consider changes in circumstances that would suggest how
a legislator who supported the purpose of the statute would apply it in a context
that Congress may not have considered.38 The same techniques may be used to
determine how legislators’ would evaluate the significance of harms against which
the statute protects or the causal connections between statutory violations and
those harms in a context that goes beyond what the statute envisioned.
We must be candid, however, that surmising legislators’ likely
understanding of the significance of injuries and causal nexus supposes a
“reasonable legislator” for whom statutory provisions aim to achieve a coherent
goal.39 Essentially, our construction of legislative understanding reflects how a
judge envisions legislators would have understood these factors had those voting
for the statute actually considered them. Hence, we cannot justify use of
purposivist inference by arguing that the understandings it reveals necessarily
represent a legislative consensus about the elements of standing. Like purposivist
interpretation, our approach reflects a sharing of determinations of policy between
the legislature and the interpreting judge.40 Nonetheless, we believe that the use of
purposivist techniques is especially defensible when guiding judges’ standing
inquiries.
Various aspects of imputing legislative purpose are, in some sense,
convenient oversimplifications. Such oversimplifications lie at the heart of several
critiques of purposivism by proponents of alternative schools of statutory
interpretation. One critique challenges purposivism’s assumption that a single
purpose motivates a statutory provision.41 Contrary to the legal process view, 42
legislation is a process of bargaining between members of Congress who may have

37.
See Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking
Legislative Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1648 (2014) [hereinafter Rethinking
Legislative Intent] (“[P]urposivists seem to be willing to look for statutory evidence of
purpose based on all sorts of evidence that Congress may or may not have had before it—
regulations, advisory committee reports”).
38.
See Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123
HARV. L. REV. 4, 23 (2009) (identifying “translation theory . . . as a version of purposivism
that tries to map original understandings onto changed circumstances by boosting the level
of generality at which those understandings are defined”).
39.
Cf. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1378
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (when interpreting a statute a
judge should assume that “the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing
reasonable purposes reasonably”).
40.
See Victoria Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation,
the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation Of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1169
(2011).
41.
See Nourse, Rethinking Legislative Intent, supra note 37, at 1623.
42.
Purposivism derives, in large part, from the work of the legal process
theorists Hart and Sacks, who contended that an interpreter should decide what purpose
should be attributed to any relevant provision of a statute and then should interpret those
words “so as to carry out the purpose as best it can.” HART & SACKS, supra note 39, at 1374.
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different goals.43 Thus, statutes often involve an explicit balance of purposes, and
the furtherance of one will often undermine another.44 Even if the legislative
process does not explicitly identify competing purposes, there is always the
competing purpose of cost. Pursuing any purpose single-mindedly will quickly
lead to unacceptable deprivation of resources from other crucial needs of society. 45
For this reason, the workability of purposivism requires judges to identify a
purpose that incorporates some limiting principle. Yet, any limiting principle
depends on the level of generality at which purposivism operates—the more
specifically the judicially chosen purpose relates to the particular statutory text at
issue, the more likely it is to incorporate limits that constrain judicial
interpretation.46 Traditional purposivism, however, provides little constraint on
judges when choosing the level of generality of the statutory purpose and hence on
the ability of judges to sway interpretive outcomes to their preferences.47
But recognizing an injury as sufficiently grave in nature and likely to
result from a statutory violation does not pose the same line drawing problems as
defining how far a statutory purpose extends. Allowing individuals to sue in
federal court to protect an interest does not commit the court regarding the extent
to which the statute protects that interest. In other words, finding an implicit or
constructive congressional understanding that an injury warrants judicial
protection does not preclude the court from determining that the statute
implements a balance between competing interests or from interpreting or applying
the statute contrary to the plaintiff’s interest.
In addition, the lack of alternative means to constrain judicial discretion
with respect to congressional understandings regarding injuries and causal
connections makes purposivist techniques less objectionable for standing inquiries
than for questions of statutory interpretation. In the interpretation context,
textualist critics of purposivism complain that legislative history is too easily
manipulated by members of Congress to support interpretations that do not reflect
bargains actually made to obtain passage of the legislation.48 Textualists also
43.
See McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in
Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992) (“legislation usually results from
bargaining among numerous parties having a wider diversity of purposes”); Daniel B.
Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory Interpretations,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1209 (2007) (“[P]roponents of legislation typically must
compromise with the moderates whose support is necessary to create a majority coalition.”).
44.
See Mark Seidenfeld, A Process Failure Theory of Statutory Interpretation,
56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 467, 482 (2014).
45.
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 541
(1983) (“No matter how good the end in view, achievement of the end will have some cost,
and at some point the cost will begin to exceed the benefits.”).
46.
See Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 404–
05 (2012) (describing the generality problem posed by purposivist statutory interpretation).
47.
See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 151–
53.
48.
See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 376–77 (2012); John F. Manning, Chevron and
Legislative History, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1517, 1538 n.119 (2014) (quoting from Exxon
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criticize judicial reliance on legislative history as too malleable to constrain judges
from imposing their own preferences.49 Textualists propose, instead, reliance on
objective rules for decoding the meaning of statutory text, which they claim
provide greater constraint against such judicial abuse. 50
Statutory text, however, rarely evaluates the potential harms caused by
statutory or regulatory violations directly. Thus, except in those rare cases where
Congress includes a provision that expressly communicates an understanding
about the significance of the potential injury or causal connections stemming from
such violations, there is no alternative for evaluating such understanding superior
to purposivist techniques. When evaluating those elements of standing, the
alternative to those techniques is unguided subjective judgment by individual
judges.51 A judge might try to justify her judgment about whether a plaintiff in
particular circumstances has demonstrated standing by comparison with other
cases or analogy to other injuries. But, under current standing doctrine, there are
no well-accepted standards that govern whether the elements of standing have
been adequately satisfied. This may be why standing doctrine has been criticized
for being extremely susceptible to judicial manipulation, whether deliberate or
unconscious.52
Given this alternative, asking judges to relate their standing inquiry to the
mischief at which a statutory provision seems aimed, although not outcome
determinative, will provide a more meaningful yardstick for evaluating
determinations with respect to the elements of standing. 53 That is, the nature of the

Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005)). See also Seidenfeld,
supra note 44, at 478–79.
49.
See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 48, at 377–78. See also Jonathan T.
Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 30 (2006) (“[T]extualists
demonstrated that [traditional] purposivist judges were imposing their own purposes, rather
than implementing Congress’s.”). But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism
and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 551(2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA &
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012) (arguing
that empirical evidence refutes claims that textualism constrains judges more than does
purposivism)).
50.
See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from
the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and The Canons:
Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 784 (2014); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of
the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2001).
51.
See Re, supra note 19, at 1195 & 1195 nn. 20–23; Gene R. Nichol, Jr.,
Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 305, 315
(2002) (“What is missing [from the Court’s standing doctrine], in the end, is a formula to
explain when the Court applies a demanding injury standard and when it is apt to be
ignored.”). See also Fletcher, supra note 9, at 231 (criticizing the injury in fact requirement
as incoherent because it seeks a neutral answer to a question that requires a normative
structure).
52.
See supra note 12 (citing examples of such criticism).
53.
Framed in terms of Fletcher’s critique, imaginative reconstruction can
provide the normative framework for evaluating whether the plaintiff-alleged injury is
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matter at which a statute is aimed would provide more objective criteria to
evaluate standing decisions than the purely subjective “I know it when I see it”
standard that judges implicitly invoke. In addition, referring to the mischief that
the statute seems to target will result in standing determinations that fit more
coherently with the perceived purposes of the statute that the plaintiff claims the
defendant violated. That is, by using statutory text, structure, and purpose to
impute a legislative evaluation of injuries and their causal connections to statutory
violations, judges will deflect criticism for using their own sensibilities to decide
standing issues in a manner that undermines the interests that the statute seems
structured to protect.

II. THE LUJAN MAJORITY & THE IMPORTANCE OF ARTICLE II
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court tied standing law to
the President’s power to enforce the law. 54 Lujan involved a challenge to a rule,
promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, interpreting the Endangered Species
Act of 1973 to require consultation only for actions taken in the United States or
on the high seas.55 The plaintiffs alleged that the lack of consultation with respect
to foreign activities increased the rate of extinction of endangered species. 56
Specifically, the Court focused on two members of the plaintiff organization who
alleged that they intended to return to habitats of particular endangered species,
and that the rule reduced the likelihood of them seeing members of those species.57
The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege a concrete injury and demonstrate
redressability.58
Of particular interest with respect to Congress’s ability to influence
standing, Lujan declined to grant the plaintiffs standing based on the citizen-suit
provision of the statute.59 Prior to Lujan, Professor (now Judge) William Fletcher’s
critique of standing provided the most academically accepted alternative to the
current doctrine’s requirements of injury in fact, traceability, and redressability. 60
Fletcher concluded that the case or controversy requirement should be satisfied as
long as Congress provided a cause of action that authorized a particular plaintiff to
sufficient to warrant granting him access to federal courts. See Fletcher, supra note 9, at
229–34.
54.
504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992).
55.
Id. at 557–58.
56.
Id. at 562.
57.
Id. at 563.
58.
Id. at 562–68.
59.
Id. at 576 (“Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation
of Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in our cases, they would
be discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional role of the
Third Branch—one of the essential elements that identifies those ‘Cases’ and
‘Controversies’ that are the business of the courts rather than of the political branches.”).
60.
In the words of Heather Elliott, “[Fletcher’s] The Structure of Standing has
become an ever more incisive critique of standing doctrine. It has been cited hundreds of
times by scholars and courts, including the Supreme Court itself. It has been called ‘simply
the best thing ever written on ”standing.” Heather Elliott, The Structure of Standing at 25:
Introduction to the Symposium, 65 ALA. L. REV. 269, 270–71 (2013).
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sue.61 The Lujan Court, however, reasoned that allowing citizens to enforce the
law usurps the power of the executive branch and interferes with the Take Care
Clause of Article II.62 Although the Court grounded its ultimate analysis in Article
III, by considering the President’s enforcement prerogatives the Lujan majority
rationale can be understood as viewing Article II as a limit on Congress’s ability to
enact statutes that influence standing. 63 Lujan pointed out that rendering standing
coterminous with a cause of action, as Fletcher advocated, would essentially allow
Congress to deputize private citizens to enforce the law.64 As a result, this
rendering would undermine the role of the executive branch to see that the law is
faithfully executed and to prosecute violations of it.65
The Court’s holding regarding the relation of standing doctrine to Article
II limited the effect of citizen-suit provisions to creating a cause of action that a
plaintiff may assert only if she meets the requirements of standing. This holding is
central to the focus of this Article because it serves as a limitation on Congress’s
ability to influence standing. The emphasis on a concrete injury-in-fact, as opposed
to an injury to a legal interest, ensures that the plaintiff cannot simply enforce the
law, but must attempt to vindicate her personal interest. This emphasis shapes the
remainder of this Article’s analysis.

III. JUSTICE KENNEDY’S LUJAN CONCURRENCE
Congress’s role in recognizing the harms and chains of causation that
give rise to standing is supported by Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Lujan.66
This concurrence is extremely significant because both Justices Kennedy and
Souter, who joined the concurrence, supported Justice Scalia’s majority opinion.
Their votes were necessary for Scalia’s opinion to garner majority status. Thus,
Kennedy’s concurrence reflects the position of the median voter on the Court 67
and, for that reason, arguably is the law with respect to Congress’s ability to
identify injury that satisfies standing. 68 Moreover, the majority in Massachusetts v.
EPA, states that congressional “authorization [of this type of judicial challenge] is
61.
Fletcher, supra note 9, at 229.
62.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (“To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated
public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’
vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the
Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed, Art. II, § 3.”).
63.
See Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine, 11
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 781, 831–32 (2009).
64.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577–78.
65.
Id. at 577.
66.
Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
67.
Buzbee, supra note 34, at 257–60 (noting that Justices Kennedy and Souter
joined Part IV of the majority opinion but added “observations” that qualify the majority
opinion).
68.
See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (announcing what is
essentially the median voter rule for determining the holding of a split court); Saul
Levmore, Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 87,
94–96 (2002) (describing the Marks rule and its relation to the median voter criterion).
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of critical importance to the standing inquiry,”69 and then proceeds to quote critical
language from Kennedy’s Lujan concurrence.70 This suggests that the Court has
accepted Kennedy’s concurrence as the prevailing law. Thus, determining the
concurrence’s precise meaning is of utmost importance.
Justice Kennedy’s language in Lujan is ambiguous yet illustrative. There
is a tension between his professed understanding of Congress’s role and the precise
words he uses. He begins describing his understanding of injury-in-fact by noting
the importance of concreteness and imminence. 71 He then proceeds to discuss his
view of Congress’s ability to influence standing inquiries. He explicitly states that,
in light of the increasing complexity and reach of government programs and
policies, Congress has a role “in the articulation of new rights of action that do not
have clear analogs in common law tradition.”72 He continues by asserting that
“Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that
will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.”73 But he
concludes by placing a limit on that congressional role, requiring that “[i]n
exercising this power . . . Congress must at the very least identify the injury it
seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring
suit.”74
Much of the confusion about Justice Kennedy’s opinion lies in its
statement that Congress can define injuries, because Kennedy joined in the
majority opinion, which foreclosed congressionally created standing. But a more
careful reading of Kennedy’s entire concurrence helps resolve this seeming
contradiction. First, Kennedy does not understand the majority to hold that
Congress cannot play the role he outlines.75 He tries to resolve the seeming
inconsistency between his opinion and the Lujan majority with crucial language
that reinforces the importance of a concrete injury and discusses the limitations on
Congress’s power:
The Court’s holding that there is an outer limit to the power of
Congress to confer rights of action is a direct and necessary
consequence of the case and controversy limitations found in
Article III. I agree that it would exceed those limitations if, at the
69.
549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007). See also William Buzbee et al., Access to Courts
after Massachusetts v. EPA: Who Has Been Left Standing? 37 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. LAW
INST.) 10692, 10697 (Sept. 2007).
70.
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516–17.
71.
“Abstract injury is not enough. The plaintiff must show that he ‘has sustained
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury’ as the result of the challenged
official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both ‘real and immediate,’ not
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting L.A. v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983)).
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
After asserting Congress’s power to define injuries and articulate chains of
causation, Justice Kennedy wrote: “I do not read the Court’s opinion to suggest a contrary
view.” Id.
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behest of Congress and in the absence of any showing of
concrete injury, we were to entertain citizen suits to vindicate the
public’s nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the
laws. . . . [T]he party bringing suit must show that the action
injures him in a concrete and personal way. This requirement is
not just an empty formality. It preserves the vitality of the
adversarial process by assuring both that the parties before the
court have an actual, as opposed to professed, stake in the
outcome, and that “the legal questions presented . . . will be
resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but
in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation
of the consequences of judicial action.”76
The underlying message seems clear—abstract injuries are outside the
scope of Congress’s ability to give rise to standing—yet Congress has some role in
identifying injuries that are sufficient to support standing. This still leaves
unanswered several crucial questions: What does it mean to define new injuries?
And what is the outer limit of Congress’s power to do so?
Scholars have attempted to clarify this matter, albeit not in a particularly
convincing manner. One approach reads Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as
granting Congress broad powers to create standing, as long as Congress does so
through carefully drafted legislation.77 We term this approach the “express
legislation” interpretation of Kennedy’s concurrence, and believe that it reflects
the historical understanding that denial of a legal right is the essence of injury
sufficient for standing.78 The express legislation interpretation essentially relies on
the fact that the injury-in-fact test was meant to liberalize standing, not to deny
Congress a power it historically had exercised.79 Congress’s legislative power
includes the “authority to create rights of action by statute by defining injuries and
causal relationships” between prohibited conduct and those injuries.80 And because
those causes of action create legal rights, the express legislation interpretation
reasons that, in the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), Congress could grant
standing to citizens by “identify[ing] or creat[ing] a general public interest in
endangered species, and provid[ing] explicitly that the deprivation of that interest
constitutes an injury that a federal court must vindicate at the behest of any
citizen.”81 In other words, historically, Congress has had the statutory authority to
create legal protection for nonconcrete injuries. It also essentially had the authority

76.
Id. at 580–81.
77.
See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a
Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1181 (1993); Sunstein,
supra note 5, at 202.
78.
See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text.
79.
See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68, 73–74
(1984) (noting that one goal of the injury in fact doctrine was to “liberalize access to the
federal courts”).
80.
Pierce, supra note 77, at 1180–81.
81.
Id. at 1181.
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to create standing based on the deprivation of that legal protection, as long as the
statute was sufficiently explicit about to whom it provided such protections.
Moreover, Congress has historically been permitted to “create quite novel
property interests.”82 Under the express legislation interpretation, therefore, the
constitutional flaw in the Lujan plaintiffs’ assertion of standing was that “[the]
plaintiffs had no property right under the ESA, because Congress failed explicitly
to define the relevant injury when it provided for citizen suits.” 83 This broad
construction of the concurrence relies chiefly on Justice Kennedy’s statement that
Congress can define new injuries and articulate new chains of causation.
Ultimately, however, the express legislation theory is problematic because it fails
to take into account Kennedy’s explicit rejection of the possibility of abstract
injuries giving rise to standing, even at the “behest of Congress.” 84
Another interpretation of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which we term
the “minimal effect” approach, reads his opinion as stopping short of providing
any meaningful distinction from Justice Scalia’s majority opinion or any novel
idea about the standing doctrine. Under this theory, “Kennedy’s sentence about
being able to create a case or controversy where none existed before is simply his
way of repeating the truism that the Court has stated for years—that Congress may
create new rights, the violation of which might well constitute concrete injury-infact as judged by the Court.”85 Under the minimal effect approach, because it is the
Court, not Congress, that decides what injuries are concrete, Congress’s role in
standing is no greater than that of a party to the case—it can merely identify
injuries that the Court might find sufficient to support standing. 86 Any ability to
“upgrade” factually diffuse injuries that would otherwise be inadequate to confer
standing is marginal. Intangible harms would still be insufficient to establish
standing, regardless of any contrary statements that Congress includes in the
statute.87 Professor Heather Elliott has opined that the Court is likely to adopt the
minimal effects approach,88 concluding that “Congress’s power is to convert de
facto into de jure and nothing more.”89 Although this approach is correct in
acknowledging that Kennedy’s concurrence is not an endorsement of
congressionally created standing, it shortchanges the important institutional role
Congress has in recognizing actual harms that give rise to standing.
82.
Sunstein, supra note 5, at 235–36.
83.
Id. at 234.
84.
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580–81 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
85.
Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty
Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 218 (2012) (emphasis added).
86.
Of course, unlike parties to the case, Congress can create a cause of action.
87.
Re, supra note 19, at 1233.
88.
Elliott reasons that the Court has not been receptive to deference to
Congressional findings of fact in other contexts that affect separation of powers, and that the
Court hinted in Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496–97 (2009), that it would
not allow Congress to recognize injuries that the Court did not find to be concrete as
sufficient to support standing. Elliott, supra note 8, at 186–94.
89.
Id. at 194.
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Although each of these theories is supported by some part of Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence, that opinion is best viewed as a whole and in the context
of the majority opinion. Our reading of Kennedy’s concurrence explores
Congress’s ability to influence standing while explicitly assuming that that ability
is neither plenary nor null. We further read Kennedy’s concurrence as
acknowledging that Congress has the power to recognize actual harms and causal
connections and, thereby, can give rise to standing for injuries that the Court might
otherwise find attenuated or insufficiently concrete.
Three factors support the conclusion that Justice Kennedy understands
that Congress has the authority to recognize actual harms that give rise to standing
but not to create purely legal interests whose deprivation would do so. First,
Kennedy’s concurrence made a clear effort to go beyond the majority to demarcate
some congressional power with respect to standing. 90 Although the use of terms
“define and articulate” may be imprecise, the main point of Kennedy’s
concurrence clarified that Congress can influence whether a particular matter rises
to the level of case or controversy. Second, Kennedy’s opinion repeatedly
emphasized the importance of concreteness for injury in fact. 91 Thus, Kennedy’s
proposed role for Congress is tempered by his insistence that it is beyond the scope
of Congress’s authority to render a suit to protect nonconcrete interests justiciable.
This clear distinction between the abstract and the concrete was further
underscored when Kennedy joined the majority opinion’s Article II rationale that
prohibits Congress from deputizing private parties to enforce the law. 92 Hence,
Kennedy’s concurrence provides a complement rather than a substitute for Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion. Third, Kennedy’s post-Lujan opinions continue to point
to a limited power of Congress to recognize injuries and causal chains that
otherwise would be insufficient to support standing. For example, in his
concurrence in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, Kennedy poignantly points out
that “[n]othing in the statute at issue here . . . indicates Congress intended to
identify or confer some interest separate and apart from a procedural right.”93
The textual support in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is bolstered by our
normative argument that Congress is institutionally superior at assessing the
degree of injuries that are foreseeable from statutory violations. 94 In fact,
Kennedy’s concurrence can be seen as a guide to how Congress’s institutional
superiority should play out in particular cases. It essentially directs the courts to
defer to understandings about impacts from statutory violations that can be
discerned from the causes of action a statute provides.
The following example illustrates an injury that we believe would suffice
to establish a plaintiff’s standing under our reading of Justice Kennedy’s Lujan
concurrence, but not under the Scalia majority opinion. Suppose that Congress had
included a provision in the ESA authorizing zookeepers to sue to protect
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 61–67 and accompanying text.
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 501 (2009).
See supra Section I.A.
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endangered species with which they worked in captivity. Suppose further that the
statute explicitly recognized that zookeepers need captured wild animals to keep
captive stocks from being genetically inbred. In that hypothetical scenario,
Congress would have identified that the injury applies to a specified class of
people—zookeepers. Second, Congress would also have articulated the chain of
causation between the injury and the class of persons entitled to bring suit—the
loss of a species would hinder zookeepers’ ability to maintain viable captive
populations. Third, the injury would be to an interest that exists independently of
any rights granted by the statute. As such, Congress would have identified an
actual injury and not merely expressed a desire to see the law enforced. This
hypothetical provision would, therefore, seem directly to meet Kennedy’s
requirements for Congress to grant standing. Moreover, this example is most
interesting because the Lujan majority states, “It goes beyond the limit [of
plausibility] . . . to say that anyone who observes or works with an endangered
species, anywhere in the world, is appreciably harmed by a single project affecting
some portion of that species with which he has no more specific connection.”95
Thus, the precise interest that would give rise to standing under this statute was
explicitly held to be insufficient by the Lujan majority.
We also believe that standing is normatively appropriate in this
hypothetical scenario. As discussed earlier, whether the effect on a zookeeper from
the loss of wild stock to replenish captive genetics is sufficiently palpable to
comprise injury in fact comes down to a value judgment. There is no right or
wrong answer, and no objective standard for evaluating whether the injury to
zookeepers is sufficient. Congress is better able than the courts to answer this
question because it is more in tune with the ultimate values of the people and
because it is institutionally better able to determine the likely effect of this loss of
wild stock.
In sum, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence illustrates an important avenue by
which Congress can influence standing, even under current doctrine. It recognizes
Justice Scalia’s point that the executive is responsible for executing the law and
that Congress cannot deputize private citizens to do so. But, it goes beyond the
majority by recognizing that Congress has a role in identifying injuries and causal
connections sufficient to meet the Court’s standing requirements.

IV. LUJAN’S FOOTNOTE SEVEN
Although Justice Kennedy’s Lujan concurrence suggests the need for
Congress to explicitly recognize concrete injuries and chains of causation, Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion suggests that congressional creation of general
procedural rights, without more, can affect the judicial inquiry into standing. In
footnote seven of the majority, Scalia opines that a person “who has been accorded
a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without
meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.”96 Although
footnote seven does not explain why such rights might affect the standing inquiry,
95.
96.

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 567 (1992).
Id. at 573 n.7.
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we posit that the best explanation hinges on Congress having implicitly recognized
causal connections and the imminence of any concrete injury at issue by providing
procedural rights.
Just as Justice Kennedy’s concurrence has prompted a variety of
interpretations, so has Justice Scalia’s footnote seven. A broad reading of the
footnote would lower a plaintiff’s burden to show traceability and redressability
generally, and might even relieve a plaintiff of making any showing of these
elements at all.97 This reading, however, is hard to square with the entirety of
Scalia’s majority opinion, which rejects standing with respect to some injuries that
the plaintiff alleged because those injuries were not redressable.98 Additionally,
reading footnote seven as an invitation for courts to relax traceability/redressability
to an extreme extent creates tension with the rest of the majority opinion because a
plaintiff with a procedural right could obtain standing by alleging an immediate
and concrete injury whose relation to the defendant’s wrongful act was far-fetched.
Essentially, this would convert a procedural right and a citizen suit provision into
virtually guaranteed standing.
The very nature of what footnote seven means by “a procedural right” is
also an issue. For example, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court considered a
citizen suit provision to be a procedural right and relied on footnote seven to
reduce the plaintiff’s burden of showing the traceability of the alleged injury to the
impacts of the EPA’s failure to address the effect of automobile carbon emissions
on climate change.99 This stretch of the procedural right to which footnote seven
refers is in tension with the entirety of the Lujan majority, which explicitly rejects
the notion that a procedural right can be transformed into an interest that
constitutes injury-in-fact.100 Instead, footnote seven is better read to reflect the idea
that courts should give deference in their standing inquiries to Congress’s
determination that a procedure with which an agency is required to comply before
acting is important to prevent potential concrete impacts that the action would
threaten. This reading is both consistent with the majority holding and normatively
sensible because it avoids courts having to draw arbitrary lines that other
interpretations necessitate.
In analyzing the meaning of footnote seven, it is imperative to note at the
outset that it refers to procedural rights, not procedural injuries. The majority
rejects the notion that statutory violations rise to the level of injuries because they
are not concrete, actual harms. Recognizing purely procedural violations as
injuries would undermine Article II’s Take Care Clause because it would
essentially deputize private entities that have no concrete interest at stake to sue to
force compliance with legally mandated procedures.101 Procedural rights, however,
97.
See Bruce Morris, How Footnote 7 in Lujan II May Expand Standing for
Procedural Injuries, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 75, 75 (Winter, 1995).
98.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568.
99.
Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007).
100.
504 U.S. at 576.
101.
Justice Scalia rejects the idea that “the Government’s violation of a certain
(undescribed) class of procedural duty satisfies the concrete-injury requirement by itself,
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can affect how courts evaluate whether a plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded the
usual standing requirements of injury-in-fact, traceability, and redressability.
Footnote seven gives an example of how a procedural right would alter
the usual standing inquiry. It considers the proposed building of a dam that
requires an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) before construction
commences. The footnote explicitly states that a person living adjacent to the
proposed construction site will not be denied standing because “he cannot establish
with any certainty that the [EIS] will cause the license to be withheld or altered.”102
This statement, in combination with Justice Scalia’s earlier mention of relaxed
redressability and immediacy standards, has led some scholars to suggest that all
that is needed for standing, with respect to procedural rights, is a showing of a
concrete injury.103 Once again, this suggestion contrasts with the rest of the
majority’s opinion in Lujan, which denied plaintiffs standing partly because of the
lack of redressability.
Although all agree that footnote seven does not excuse a plaintiff from
meeting the concrete injury requirement, what remains ambiguous is the degree to
which the redressability and immediacy requirements are relaxed. 104 Some
scholars have grappled with the question of the Court’s authority to relax or lower
the standards of redressability given that Article III mandates both injury-in-fact
and redressability as prerequisites for standing. 105 Professor Cass Sunstein has
argued that the very notion that the Court can relax the redressability standard
suggests that it is really an irrelevant requirement.106 Although we agree with
Professor Sunstein’s assessment of Congress’s role in creating procedural rights

without any showing that the procedural violation endangers a concrete interest of the
plaintiff (apart from his interest in having the procedure observed).” Id. at 573 n.8.
102.
Id. at 572 n.7.
103.
Morris, supra note 97, at 75 (stating that even when redressability cannot be
shown, “a citizen who can articulate a concrete, particularized interest within the protection
of the statute should be able to establish standing to challenge violations of the statutory
procedure”). See also William W. Buzbee, Expanding the Zone, Tilting the Field: Zone of
Interests and Article III Standing Analysis After Bennett v. Spear, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 763,
803 (1997) (stating “[t]he lesson of Defenders’ footnote[] seven . . . seemed to be that no
certainty or even probability of changed outcomes is necessary when a plaintiff with a
threatened concrete interest complains of a procedural irregularity”).
104.
Christopher T. Burt, Procedural Injury Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 285–86 (1995) (stating that footnote seven is “at
best . . . vague and provides little guidance for prospective plaintiffs and the lower courts; at
worst, it eviscerates the standing requirements of the Constitution”).
105.
Id.
106.
Sunstein has stated, “I think that the Court’s . . . [relaxation of redressability
standards] exemplifies several of the problems associated with the whole notion of
redressability. A procedural right is created, not because it necessarily yields particular
outcomes, but because it structures incentives and creates pressures that Congress has
deemed important to effective regulation. . . . Congress is attempting not to dictate
outcomes but to create procedural guarantees that will produce certain regulatory incentives.
Redressability in the conventional sense is irrelevant.” Sunstein, supra note 5, at 225–26.
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and the significance of those rights, we do not think that such relaxation
necessarily renders the notion of redressability either irrelevant or unprincipled.
One can tie the denial of a procedural right to a plaintiff’s burden to show
immediacy and traceability of harm by recognizing what Congress’s requirement
of procedure implies about its understanding of the likelihood of immediate harm.
If Congress mandated a procedure for an agency to follow before acting, then one
can surmise that Congress envisioned that the procedure might convince the
agency to act differently. Or, to use Professor Sunstein’s terminology, the
procedure changes agency incentives and, even though it does not dictate
outcomes, it can change likely outcomes. 107 For that reason, the government
cannot assert that the agency would have made the same decision even if it had
followed the procedure. Such an assertion would contradict Congress’s implicit
understanding that the procedure might have mattered.
Similarly, if Congress mandated that an agency follow the procedure well
before the ultimate agency action would cause injury against which the procedure
is meant to protect, then Congress must have believed that the harm was
sufficiently imminent for the agency to have to consider it now rather than later.
But, that implies that the harm is sufficiently imminent for the plaintiff reasonably
to worry about it now. Beyond these two observations, however, procedure has no
relationship to the immediacy or redressability of the harm. Hence, the relationship
of the procedure to the harm justifies relaxing the plaintiff’s burden so he need not
show either that the procedure would have changed the government decision or
that the resulting harm was sufficiently imminent to warrant bothering the court to
protect the plaintiff against it. Any relaxation of standing requirements beyond
these two points would simply be an arbitrary assertion by a court that, for some
unexplained reason, immediacy or traceability of harm is not necessary for
standing when Congress happens to have provided a procedural right.
One might object that even the limited relaxation of causal nexus and
immediacy that we read footnote seven to support is unwarranted under our
rationale of congressional motivation. Congress may have added procedure simply
to increase the costs of agency action to discourage such action,108 or it may have
added procedure to provide a fire-alarm system that allows opponents to alert
Congress about impending agency action. 109 But, allowing judges to deny
plaintiffs’ standing merely because of a remote possibility that Congress’s
motivation for adding procedure was perversely unrelated to improving the agency
decision-making process, essentially would permit judges to override legislators’
likely understanding of causal connections between procedures and agency
outcomes. At the very least, judges should not do so without a persuasive showing
107.
See id. (“A procedural right is created, not because it necessarily yields
particular outcomes, but because it structures incentives and creates pressures that Congress
has deemed important to effective regulation.”).
108.
See Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the
Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 402 (1978).
109.
Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
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by a defendant that the particular procedure at issue was motivated by something
other than a desire to improve the agency decision-making process. Moreover, we
cannot think of a more limited relaxation of redressability and immediacy that
would be consistent with footnote seven, especially in light of the hypothetical
proposed dam it discusses.
Massachusetts v. EPA provides an example of the Court applying
footnote seven to relax redressability requirements in an unjustified and ad hoc
manner. Massachusetts’ first error was its determination that a citizen-suit
provision provides a procedural right as that term is used in Lujan’s footnote
seven. In Massachusetts, the Court reasoned that the statutorily provided right to
challenge the EPA’s denial of a petition asking it to regulate an air pollutant was a
procedural right.110 Although one can undoubtedly characterize the right to sue as a
procedural right, it differs in fundamental ways from a right to have the agency
follow a statutorily specified procedure, which is the kind of procedural right to
which footnote seven seems to refer. Indeed, the example of an agency preparing
an EIS for a proposed dam in footnote seven makes the distinction regarding the
nature of the procedural right at issue abundantly clear.
The Massachusetts Court’s second error was in relaxing the redressability
standard in an unspecified manner not tied in any logical way to the procedural
right it found in the statute. 111 Massachusetts did allege a concrete injury—the loss
of land along the littoral zone due to a rise in sea level that would result from
global warming.112 The problem was that the petitioners could not predict with any
reliability how carbon emissions from motor vehicles would affect the global rise
in temperatures. The emission of carbon might account for an imperceptible
amount of sea-level rise, and might even be offset by other countries increasing
their carbon emissions.113 And, any loss of coastal land due to failure to reduce

110.
549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
111.
Id. at 517–18. See also id. at 540 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (claiming that
the majority never explained how its “special solicitude” for Massachusetts affected its
standing analysis except for “an implicit concession that petitioners cannot establish
standing on traditional terms”).
112.
Id. at 521–23.
113.
See id. at 546 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court contends that regulating
domestic motor vehicle emissions will reduce carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and
therefore redress Massachusetts’s injury. But even if regulation does reduce emissions—to
some indeterminate degree, given events elsewhere in the world—the Court never explains
why that makes it likely that the injury in fact—the loss of land—will be redressed.”)
(emphasis in original); Calvin Massey, State Standing After Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 FLA.
L. REV. 249, 257 (2009) (“the Court . . . characterized Massachusetts’ injury as including an
inevitable future loss of its coastline, however remote and quantitatively uncertain that loss
may be”); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 68 (“[The Court] sustained Massachusetts’s right to sue based on fairly generalized and
speculative claims of injury and causation.”)
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motor vehicle carbon emissions would be temporally remote from the denial of the
plaintiffs’ petition.114
The Massachusetts Court stated up front that the procedural right
warranted relaxing redressability in some unspecified manner. It then proceeded to
simply assert that, despite significant uncertainty about whether and how failure to
regulate greenhouse gasses would affect the plaintiff’s interest, the plaintiff had
met its lowered burden of proving redressability. 115 One is left to wonder what the
lower burden entailed, let alone why the court thought a lower burden was
justified. In Massachusetts, the Court did state, “[w]hen a litigant is vested with a
procedural right, that litigant has standing if there is some possibility that the
requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that
allegedly harmed the litigant.”116 In so stating, the Court seems to recognize that
the existence of procedure must defeat a government claim that the agency’s
decision would have been the same even if the procedure had been followed. The
problem is that the Massachusetts Court took the further step of holding that
somehow the change in the agency decision would protect the plaintiff against
injury even though there was no indication that the agency action itself affected the
plaintiff in a sufficiently specified manner.117
Without properly recognizing the scope of footnote seven’s procedural
rights and the role that those rights play as an expression of Congress’s
understanding about the likelihood that an action will occur, any relaxation of
redressability and immediacy will necessarily face the problem of arbitrary line
drawing. This problem helps explain why the circuit courts have had difficulty in
applying footnote seven in a consistent manner. 118 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits
have both allowed an unspecified relaxation of traceability/redressability
requirements,119 while the D.C. Circuit has suggested a “substantial probability”
114.
The Court recognized that the rise in sea level was a remote risk, albeit one
of potentially catastrophic harm. Nonetheless, the Court held that the “risk” would be
reduced “if the petitioners received the relief they [sought],” (even though the Court could
not assure that the harm would be reduced). 549 U.S. at 526. See also id. at 542 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (“[A]ccepting a century-long time horizon and a series of compounded
estimates renders requirements of imminence and immediacy utterly toothless.”).
115.
Id. at 525–26.
116.
Id. at 518.
117.
Id. at 544 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Petitioners are never able to trace their
alleged injuries back through this complex web to the fractional amount of global emissions
that might have been limited with EPA standards.”).
118.
Brian J. Gatchel, Informational and Procedural Standing After Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 75, 99 (1995) (noting a split in the
circuits regarding how to apply footnote seven).
119.
Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 452 (10th Cir. 1996)
(summarizing the Ninth Circuit’s test as “[o]nce a plaintiff has established an injury in fact
under NEPA, the causation and redressability requirements are relaxed,” and the Tenth
Circuit’s test as relatively easy for procedural rights plaintiffs to achieve standing if they
have a concrete injury); Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All
Injury to None, 35 ENVTL. L. 1, 59–61 (2005) (citing Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S.
Dep't of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 965 (9th Cir. 2003).
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test.120 In Florida Key Deer v. Stickney,121 a district court “found redressability not
because the concrete injury could be redressed, here the endangerment of the Key
deer, but rather because the procedural injury, not consulting with the [U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service], could be redressed by a court order.”122 Much of the
inconsistency in the meaning of footnote seven stems from courts attempting to
attribute a level of significance to procedural rights that footnote seven cannot
support.
In sum, the best reading of footnote seven recognizes that, by creating
procedural rights, Congress expects that procedure matters. If Congress requires an
agency to follow a certain procedure before taking an action that would cause
some concrete injury to an individual, then the judiciary should defer to
Congress’s implicit judgment that the procedure was an important step for
protecting against such an injury. Under this reading, footnote seven only
precludes the agency from arguing that it might have made the same decision had
it followed required procedures or that the injury from the action is too temporally
remote. Courts should not read footnote seven to lower the constitutional
requirements of immediacy and redressability in any other way. Thus, our reading
also provides clarity for lower courts regarding what constitutes a procedural right
under footnote seven and what factual showing footnote seven excuses a plaintiff
from having to make. Most importantly, by identifying the significance of
Congress’s inclusion of a procedural requirement in a statute, this reading respects
Congress’s superior institutional capacity to recognize harms and, relatedly, the
procedures warranted to protect against those harms.

V. STRUCTURAL EVIDENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL RECOGNITION OF
INJURY AND CAUSAL CHAINS
Through the concurrence and footnote seven, Lujan identifies instances in
which judges can rely on Congress’s explicit and implicit recognition of harms
and, thus, shape standing analysis. We contend that the principle underlying these
instances can apply even in the absence of a particularized statutory cause of
action or procedural right. In the absence of such provisions, courts might still find
evidence—from the structure of the statute or the story of its passage—of
congressional understanding of the significance of possible injuries in fact and
causal chains between injuries and regulatory violations. 123
120.
Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(“[U]nless there is a substantial probability . . . that the substantive agency action that
disregarded a procedural requirement created a demonstrable risk, or caused a demonstrable
increase in an existing risk of injury to the particularized interests of the plaintiff, the
plaintiff lacks standing.”); see also Mank, supra note 119, at 45.
121.
864 F.Supp. 1222 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
122.
Gatchel, supra note 118, at 103.
123.
Although this proposition might seem controversial in the standing context,
much Constitutional Law doctrine derives from the assumption that statutory structure
implies congressional determination of the significance of private entities’ conduct. For
example, courts defer to Congress’s determination under a rational basis standard of review
when evaluating whether regulated conduct has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
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The controversy addressed by the Court in Friends of the Earth v.
Laidlaw124 provides an illustrative example of how statutory structure can
appropriately affect standing. In Laidlaw, an environmental group brought suit
against a wastewater treatment plant, alleging noncompliance with a National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination (“NPDES”) permit.125 The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendant’s discharge of pollution into the North Tyger River, in violation of
its permit, instilled fear in the plaintiffs, who lived near and had previously used
the River. Central to the issue of standing was “[t]he reasonableness of [the] fear
that led the affiants to respond to [the defendant’s] concededly ongoing conduct by
refraining from use of the . . . River and surrounding areas.”126 While the court
concluded that the members’ fears were reasonable, it did not fully explain its
analysis.127 It simply “found nothing ‘improbable’ about the proposition that a
company's continuous and pervasive illegal discharges of pollutants into a river
would cause nearby residents to curtail their recreational use of that waterway.”128
Instead of employing this fuzzy reasonableness analysis, which is
subjective in nature and gives little direction to lower courts, 129 the Court would
have stood on firmer ground had it reasoned from the structure of the Clean Water
Act (“CWA”). The CWA requires polluters to meet a discharge standard
achievable by use of the Best Available Technology (“BAT”).130 The BAT
standard requires polluters to reduce pollution discharge even if the water into
which they are releasing that pollution contains pollution levels below those that
have been shown to threaten human health and the environment. Thus, the BAT
standard implicitly recognizes that quantities of pollutants below current health
based thresholds “may reasonably be anticipated to pose an unacceptable risk to
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (“In assessing the scope of Congress’s
authority under the Commerce Clause . . . . We need not determine whether respondents’
activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only
whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981) (“[W]hen Congress has determined that an
activity affects interstate commerce, the courts need inquire only whether the finding is
rational.”); see also, Sunstein, supra note 5, at 230 (suggesting that the Court should review
injury in fact determinations using the rational relationship standard that it applies to effects
on interstate commerce in commerce clause cases).
124.
528 U.S. 167 (2000).
125.
Id. at 177.
126.
Id. at 184.
127.
See William Buzbee, The Story of Laidlaw, Standing and Citizen
Enforcement, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 235 (Richard Lazarus & Oliver Houck, eds.,
2005) (“Laidlaw . . . manifested deference to legislative judgments, but did not foreclose
revival of more judge-centered, common law-like conceptions of harms to survive a
standing challenge. How Article II fits into standing analysis remains uncertain.”).
128.
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184. The Court also baldly asserted that “[t]he
proposition is entirely reasonable.” Id. at 184–85.
129.
See John F. Manning, Note, Going Back to SCRAP in Order to Refine Steel:
The Supreme Court Loosens the Modern Constraints on the Doctrine of Standing in Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (Toc), Inc., 10 WIDENER J. PUB. L.
215, 234–35 (2001).
130.
33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012).
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human health or the environment.”131 That is the only coherent justification for
implementing stringent technological-based standards to reduce discharges when
pollution levels do not impose known risks. In essence, by imposing technologicalbased standards, the CWA manifests congressional recognition that plaintiff’s
members’ fears were reasonable. And, because of Congress’s superior institutional
capacity to evaluate such fear, the Court should have deferred to this implicit
congressional recognition. Thus, our understanding of Congress’s role in standing
would have given the Laidlaw Court a less subjective basis for its determination
that fear of pollution in the North Tyger River and its surrounding area was
sufficiently concrete and palpable to constitute injury in fact.
An avowed formalist might object that the structure of the statute does not
ineluctably lead to the conclusion that Congress recognized the threat from lowlevel pollution to be a reasonable threat of injury. 132 For example, Congress might
have simply desired to subsidize the manufacturers of pollution reduction
equipment. We believe, however, that such a response to our argument carries
formalism to an indefensible extreme. Unless a statute were to state explicitly the
underlying understanding of those who voted for it, which statutes virtually never
do, one can always find an alternative explanation of what motivated the passage
of the statute. But standing law only requires that the plaintiff show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the injury she alleges is sufficiently concrete to
constitute injury in fact due to the defendant’s alleged wrongful conduct.133
Therefore, the courts would do best when evaluating standing to ask whether the
structure of the statute clearly manifests a likely understanding of those who voted
for it. Requiring more than this simply allows a judge to turn judicial passive
virtues into passive aggressiveness,134 dismissing actions simply because she does

131.
H.R. REP. NO. 95-830, at 83 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4424, 4458.
132.
But even avowed textualist formalists are willing to consider the overall
structure of a statute as well as the context surrounding its enactment to determine statutory
meaning. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Process Failure Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 467, 478 (2014).
133.
See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d
149, 163 (4th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the elements of standing are not subject to
heightened standards of proof). Thus, for example, it is sufficient that a plaintiff use an area
that is visibly affected to claim injury to her aesthetic sensibilities, see Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972), even without further proof that she truly finds the
sight distasteful. This is not to be confused with the requirement of showing that future
injury will actually occur, which seems to require proof that harm is “certainly impending,”
or a “substantial risk.” See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1147, 1150 n.5
(2013). That requirement derives from the fact that injury in fact must not be speculative,
rather than from the level of proof by which it must be proven.
134.
Cf. Mark A. Graber, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues: Cohens v. Virginia and
the Problematic Establishment of Judicial Power, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 67–68 (Spring
1995) (first referring to judicial exercise of discretion about whether to hear a case as
“passive aggressive”).
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not find the alleged injury or causal chain sufficiently convincing, or even perhaps
because she simply does not like the probable outcome of the case.135
Thus, reading the structure of statutes to support likely congressional
understandings about injuries and causal chains has the potential to ameliorate
accusations of judicial abuse in applying standing doctrine. For example, earlier
this Article demonstrated that the Court’s determination of standing in
Massachusetts v. EPA was based on an indefensible reading of Lujan’s footnote
seven, and appeared to be an assertion of standing by judicial fiat. 136 But we
believe that the Massachusetts Court reached the correct outcome with regard to
the standing inquiry in that case for other reasons.
In particular, our analysis of Laidlaw can be applied to Massachusetts and
would support the conclusion that the state of Massachusetts had standing on
analytically firmer ground than the Court’s actual rationale. In Massachusetts, no
one questioned whether the state alleged a concrete injury: loss of land to rising
sea level is certainly concrete. And, by the time the case reached the Court, no one
seriously questioned whether climate change was occurring or whether it would
cause at least some rise in sea level. 137 Massachusetts’ standing was vulnerable
because of the uncertainty related to the extent to which failure to regulate carbon
emissions from mobile sources would contribute to global warming and the
concomitant expected rise in sea level. 138 But this potential bar to standing is
essentially the same as the one presented by the complaint in Laidlaw; although
automobile carbon emissions would make some contribution to global warming, it
was not clear if that contribution would noticeably affect any loss of coastal land
from climate change. The Clean Air Act (“CAA”), however, like the CWA,
imposes technology-based standards on air pollutants, even when levels of
pollution are below those known to be harmful.139 Such standards implicitly
recognize that it is reasonable to conclude that the effects from a small
contribution to pollution levels pose a significant threat, even if we do not
currently have the means to verify and quantify that threat. Hence, in
Massachusetts, the Court should have deferred to this implicit statutory
recognition and concluded that, even if plaintiffs could not prove the likely extent
of injury with much reliability, it was enough for them to show that lack of
regulation would contribute to some pollution that would, in turn, contribute to
global warming.

135.
Pierce, supra note 12, at 1742–43 (“[J]udges provide access to the courts to
individuals who seek to further the political and ideological agendas of judges”).
136.
See supra notes 100–06 and accompanying text.
137.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521–23 (2007) (stating there is a strong
consensus among the scientific community that climate change is linked to rising sea
levels).
138.
See id. at 542–43 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
139.
42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2010).
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VI. STATUTORY PURPOSE AS EVIDENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL
RECOGNITION OF INJURY AND CAUSAL CHAINS
Sometimes, courts can rely on an obvious purpose of a statute to impute a
legislative understanding of the gravity of injuries or the likelihood of causal
nexus. Although such use of statutory purpose requires consideration of the
context of statutory enactment that goes beyond the actual words and structure of
the statute, we believe it can provide judicial guidance that is preferable to
allowing judges free rein to evaluate the significance of injuries and the likelihood
of causal chains on their own, without statutory constraint.
The value of using statutory purpose to guide judicial standing inquiries is
illustrated by considering the Supreme Court’s decision in Linda R.S. v. Richard
D.140 In that case, the plaintiff, Linda R.S., was a mother of an illegitimate child
whose father, Richard D., had failed to provide child support. The Texas Criminal
Code made it a crime for a father not to provide such support, but the district
attorney refused to prosecute Richard D. because the Texas courts had consistently
read the child support statute to apply only to the fathers of legitimate children.141
Linda R.S. sued to have the courts declare the statute as construed by the Texas
courts to violate the equal protection clause, and essentially to order the Texas
courts to apply the statute to fathers of illegitimate children, essentially subjecting
Richard D. to potential prosecution. 142
The Court found that Linda R.S. did not have standing to bring her claim
because the matter was not redressable. The majority reasoned that subjecting
Richard D. to the statute would not necessarily induce him to pay child support.143
Having failed to pay child support, Richard D. was already subject to prosecution
under the statute, and, hence, would not gain immunity by paying the support he
owed. Essentially, the Court used the fact that Richard was already subject to
criminal prosecution to countermand the intuitive proposition that “the threat of
penal sanctions had something more than a ‘speculative’ effect on a person’s
conduct.”144 The perversity of that holding can be illustrated by imagining what the
Court would have done had Linda R.S. been a black child, and the allegations in
the case had been that the Texas Supreme Court had construed the statute not to
apply to fathers of black children. It is hard to conceive of the Court denying
standing in that hypothetical. Yet, the question of whether the Court could redress
Linda R.S.’s loss of support payments would have been the same.
140.
410 U.S. § 614 (1973).
141.
Id. at 615.
142.
Id. at 616. The plaintiff also asked the Court to order Richard D. to pay child
support. Id. at 620 (dissenting opinion). It makes sense that Linda R.S. would not have
standing to seek such an order because the order would turn the criminal statute into a civil
suit, thereby undermining the district attorney’s prosecutorial discretion. But a judicial
determination that the statute applied to the father of illegitimate as well as legitimate
children would not interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion to decide which deadbeat dads
to prosecute.
143.
Id. at 618.
144.
See id. at 621 (White, J., dissenting).

2015]

IN THE WAKE OF STATUTES

773

Although Linda R.S. was an equal protection challenge, using statutory
purpose to inform the standing inquiry makes sense because the constitutional
claim was based on a wrongful denial of financial support that the statute
guaranteed to children. Moreover, the fact that the statute at issue was enacted by
the Texas legislature rather than Congress does not render this Article’s approach
to standing irrelevant as long as one accepts that state legislators enjoy the same
institutional superiority as Congress does, vis-à-vis the courts.
A purpose-guided inquiry into whether the alleged equal protection
violation injured Linda R.S. would have avoided the perverse holding of that case.
It is unlikely that Texas adopted its criminal nonsupport statute solely out of some
belief that failure to pay child support was heinous enough to justify locking up
deadbeat dads. Rather, it is almost certain that this criminal provision was meant,
in large part, to encourage fathers to pay child support, thereby relieving the state
from bearing full financial responsibility to support children whose fathers had left
the family.145 If one accepts that motivation for the statute, then it is unlikely that a
father who failed to pay child support for some time, but who was currently paying
it, would face prosecution. Such prosecution would put the father in jail, where he
would not be able to earn money to meet his child support obligation, undermining
the purpose of the statute. Hence, an astute judge would almost certainly conclude
that members of the Texas legislature would have understood the statute as
encouraging fathers who had failed to pay child support to do so in the future,
contrary to the majority’s assertion.
Another case in which consideration of statutory purpose might have led
to a different, and almost certainly more justifiable, outcome is Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon (“EKWRO”).146 In EKWRO, the plaintiffs alleged
that IRS regulations reducing the care to indigents that hospitals had to provide to
obtain nonprofit status would result in hospitals providing less free care to them. 147
Principles of microeconomics suggest that generally hospitals would reduce levels
of free care to indigents in response to the removal of economic sanctions for that

145.
There is considerable evidence that legislatures nationwide were considering
how to enforce child support payments during the 1960s and 1970s as the number of
divorces, separations, desertions, and out-of-wedlock births increased. At issue was the
strain on welfare systems supporting children that should have been receiving child support.
Irwin Garfinkle, The Evolution of Child Support Policy, 11 FOCUS NEWSL. (U. Wis.
Madison Inst. for Res. of Poverty), no. 1, 1988 at 11–12. The Texas Criminal Code was
enacted in 1973, precisely during this nationwide crisis. Although not contemporaneous, the
Texas legislature discussed the growing problem in 1988 stating, “During the 1970’s, the
number of families headed by women doubled and the number of never-married mothers
tripled . . . 55% of the children of single parents live below the poverty line . . . AFDC
supports millions of children whose fathers are alive and capable of contributing to their
children’s upkeep . . . . Less than half of the women with child support awards or
agreements receive full payment.” COMMONWEALTH OF TEX. J. INTERIM COMM. ON CHILD
SUPPORT, MINUTES, 70th Sess., at 3 (1988).
146.
426 U.S. 26 (1976).
147.
Id. at 33.
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reduction.148 More importantly, when Congress addressed the relevant statutory
provisions that defined the conditions for hospitals’ nonprofit status, the House
initially included a provision removing the condition that hospitals provide any
indigent care so long as they meet the other requirements of section 501(c)(3) of
the Revenue Code.149 The Senate, however, removed this provision of the House
Bill,150 and the Senate version was ultimately enacted into law. 151 It does not take
much imagination to conclude that maneuvering by the House and Senate was
aimed at relieving and then reinstating conditions that would influence the care
provided by nonprofit hospitals. Thus the best explanations for this maneuvering
implies that Congress understood the Revenue Code’s conditioning nonprofit
status on the provision of indigent care as inducement to provide such care. Given
Congress’s institutional capacity to predict likely effects of such conditions, it
follows that the IRS’s loosening of such requirements likely reduced hospitals’
provision of care to the plaintiffs. Thus the EKWRO Court’s contrary
determination flies in the face of the most intelligible congressional understanding
of the effect of the condition it imposed on hospitals’ nonprofit status.

CONCLUSION
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court held that when Congress
creates a legal interest to see that the law is followed, the deprivation of that
interest, without further injury, is not sufficient for a plaintiff to meet Article III’s
standing requirements. Lujan created significant uncertainty about Congress’s
ability to influence judicial standing inquiries by creating statutory rights,
especially in light of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and the majority’s footnote
seven, both of which suggest Congress retains some role regarding such inquiries.
This Article has shown that Kennedy’s concurrence and footnote seven are best
explained by recognizing that Congress is institutionally superior to courts in
evaluating the concreteness of likely harms and the causal chains between
statutory violations and those harms—evaluations that may bear on whether a
plaintiff in a particular case has met the injury in fact and traceability elements of
Article III standing.
The Article takes this explanation further by showing that the structure of
statutory provisions that do not create causes of action might nonetheless reveal

148.
Essentially, the regulatory change lowered the hospital’s price for failing to
provide care. Basic price theory predicts that lowering the price of engaging in conduct will
increase the overall conduct in the market. See MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC
PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 12 (1996); see also Jonathan Nash, Standing’s
Expected Value, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1283, 1312–14 (2013) (noting that plaintiffs in EKWRO
would suffer a decreased probability of receiving care, and noting that Congress might
“recognize that harms in administrative law cases are generally probabilistic or systemic”
and favor agency redress of “harms of precisely that sort”).
149.
H.R. REP. NO. 91-782, at 289–90 (1969) (Conf. Rep.).
150.
S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 61 (1969).
151.
See E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Schultz, 370 F. Supp. 325, 331–32
(D.D.C. 1973), rev’d sub nom. 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated & dismissed, Simon
v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
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legislators’ likely understanding about the significance of certain harms and about
the closeness of the causal connections between harms and statutory violations.
This congressional understanding should influence judges’ standing inquiries.
Finally, the Article suggests that in the absence of other evidence of Congress’s
understanding of injuries and causal nexi, courts would do well to rely on statutory
purpose in evaluating injury in fact and traceability given that the alternative is
judges’ subjective evaluation without meaningful constraint by relevant legal
standards.

